only one variant, choosing between them on the basis of price and their 'distaste' for the genetically modified food. Specifically, let the indirect utility of the non-GM food be (a-pn) 2 and let the indirect utility of the GM variant be (a-θ-pg) 2 where 0 < θ < a. Someone who does not care about the crop variant has a value of θ=0, while someone who would never consume the GM food has a value of θ=a. Normalise the marginal utility of income at 1, so that individual demand is either (a-pn) if the non-GM product is chosen or (a-θ-pg) if the consumer opts for the GM variety. Let the density function of consumers be f with F as the corresponding cumulative function. Finally, it will be useful to define Δp = pn-pg, as the price premium paid in the market place for the non-GM food.
In the absence of any spatial externalities and with perfect competition and a free choice of variant for both producer and consumer, one of four outcomes will occur in equilibrium:
Case 1. pg-cg = pn-cn > 0 and qg + qn = 1.
Case 2. pg-cg = pn-cn = 0 and qg + qn < 1.
Case 3. pg-cg > 0; pg-cg ≥ pn-cn and qg = 1.
Case 4. pn-cn > 0; pn-cn ≥ pg-cg and qn = 1.
In case 1 all the land is planted and there are positive quantities of both crops in equilibrium and positive profits for farmers. In case 2 some land is not planted, while in cases 3 and 4 the planting of a single crop is most profitable. Case 1 occurs when θ m +1> cn -cg > θ L -1, where θ m is the mean value of θ and θ L is the lowest value of θ for which f(θ)> 0. If there are some people who do not care about the source of the crop (i.e. θ L = 0), then the right hand side of this inequality is automatically satisfied and case 4 cannot occur.
Consider now the possibility of an external effect from the GM crop, in the sense that if the GM crop is grown at one site, all crops grown within a particular distance, d, from the site are contaminated by GM varieties. I call this area the shadow of the GM crop. As a result, the consumer views all such crops as genetically modified and they therefore sell for pg. This is an extreme position in some ways, but it reflects the typical pattern of labelling regulations (in for instance Regulation (Ec) No 1830/2003 of the European Union) which are typically defined in terms of clear (but sometimes arbitrary) purity thresholds.
As we shall see below, provided d is small compared to the total area under cultivation, it has only a marginal effect on the optimal planting of the two varieties, but it may still have a sharp impact on the market equilibrium. Let δ*(qn,qg) be the minimum possible affected land given the area devoted to each of the two crops and let δ be the actual affected area. Within a rectangle of width w, δ* is a fairly straightforward function of the variables qn and qg. If either variable is zero then δ* is zero as it will be if qn+qg < 1-wd (i.e. there is an area of unplanted land large enough to separate the two crops). If qn+qg=1, (i.e. case 1) then for sufficiently small values of one of these two variables the optimal pattern of cultivation is a quarter circle of the minority crop, centred on one of the corners of the rectangle. The majority crop then occupies the rest of the rectangle.
For 1-w 2 /π > qg > w 2 /π the optimal pattern involves a single linear boundary between the two crops, across the width of the rectangle. For the purposes of simplifying exposition, I shall call this situation the central case in what follows and focus on it. I do not claim that necessarily this is empirically the most important case, but the range of parameter values brings to the fore the policy dilemmas in a fairly straightforward manner.
In conventional fashion, the planner's problem is to maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus, W: W = Consumer surplus for GM purchasers + Consumer surplus for non-GM purchasers + producer surplus for GM producers + producer surplus for non-GM producers.
Planner's problems are often set in terms of quantities. To simplify understanding of the policy analysis which follows I use a mixture of prices (for consumers) and quantities (for producers) and suppose that the planner maximizes W subject to the constraints that supply be less than or equal to total land area, that demand equal the supply for each variant and that the shadow be no less than δ*. Thus the planner maximizes:
The first two terms in this expression represent the benefits of the two varieties, the third and fourth terms are the costs and λ is the Lagrangean multiplier on the constraint that total production cannot exceed capacity. The next term represents the constraint that the area affected with GM cannot be smaller than δ*. Finally we have the two constraints that demand equals supply of the two types. Note the position of the 'δ' entries in these two constraints: total production of the GM variety is lower than the total consumption because crops from an area δ of the non-GM variety are viewed by consumers as GM crops. Conversely, production of the non-GM variety is greater than consumption, by the amount δ.
Optimizing with respect to pn, pg, qn qg and δ, first order conditions for optimality are,
The subscripts on δ* represent the partial derivatives of that function. In addition there is the potentially relevant complementary slackness condition:
Solving the equations (2)-(7) leads to the same 4 cases as above. In particular, in the central case as defined above, where δ*=wd, then δ*i = 0. As a result equations (2)-(3) are solved by setting pg = γg and pn = γ2. Using (4) and (5) we then get (γ1-γ2)=(cn-cg) so that at the optimum pn-cn= pg-cg ≥0.
Note that in the central case the first order conditions are independent of d. It follows that the solution to the first order conditions is the same with and without the presence of the externality. The difference between the two worlds concerns the area affected by the externality which represents a fixed cost of having the GM variety. As a result for d>0 the maximand is not globally concave. There are therefore two cases to consider. If d is large enough a corner solution is optimal: it will be optimal to ban the GM variety and allow only the non-GM variety to be sold. Conversely if the area δ* (=dw) is small compared to the total area under cultivation, then the optimal consumption pattern will be identical to that which pertains in the absence of the external effect. That is, if (q * n,q * g) is the optimal mix of production in the absence of the external effect, then (q unrealistic. More to the point, as long as the price received, pn' is less than that available for the non-GM crop, while the costs are the same, then no market equilibrium with all land planted and both crops can exist. If it did, then pg -cg= pn -cn, but then a producer growing the non-GM crop in the shadow could improve profits by switching to the GM variant.
A third possibility is one of Coasean-style bargaining. Given that many market equilibria are inefficient there may be scope for bargaining between producers over what is grown on adjacent land. Clearly, if all producers can bargain collectively and costlessly, then an efficient outcome might result. Since a similar argument would apply to almost any problems of externalities, bargaining involving all producers is probably not a reasonable starting point, but there may be opportunities for bargaining between smaller sets of producers that can ameliorate the stark results of the proposition. Consider first a situation where a producer has one or two neighbours and the shadow of a GM crop covers exactly the neighbouring producer's land. 3 Focus on an inefficient market outcome where pg -cg< pn -cn and the case of a producer with a GM neighbour, both of whom take prices as given. In the absence of bargaining this producer will also plant the GM. However it may be able to negotiate a deal in which both it and the neighbour switch to non-GM. If this neighbour also has a GM neighbour then the switch will raise joint profits of the negotiating producers (and produce the scope for a bilateral deal) when 2(pg -cg) < pn -cn + pg -cn or
Recall that if co-existence is optimal then efficiency requires pg -cg= pn -cn. Thus costless bilateral bargaining can possibly eliminate some of the inefficiency of the extreme outcome where non-GM is excluded from the market, but does not in general lead to the fully efficient outcome.
What happens if m>2 producers can engage in multilateral talks about simultaneously producing the non-GM crop? Provided only one of them has a GM neighbour outside the coalition, there are potential gains from bargaining amongst the m firms when:
(pg -cg) + (pn -pg)/m < pn -cn Thus, in the limit, as m→∞, the efficient outcome is achievable. Again, therefore one can conclude that as m→∞, the efficient outcome is achievable or conversely, the level of feasible multilateral bargaining sets a limit on the achievable level of efficiency. One can also conclude that in this particular example at least 9 producers must be involved for any joint gains to be achievable from bargaining. Further, though the minimum number of bargaining firms may be as small as 4, (if the producers are located in the corner of the production rectangle), simple bilateral bargaining can never produce gains to both parties in a context where all producers are initially GM.
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To sum up, the proposition is robust in the face of bargaining behaviour, provided that only bilateral bargaining is possible and if the shadow of a GM producer encompasses all the land of its neighbours. If it is feasible to have larger coalitions of producers then the extreme outcome described in the proposition may be modified: that is equilibria can exist with both GM and non-GM crops, but in general unless the maximum feasible bargaining coalition is large, the efficient outcome is not achievable.
Some Simulations.
The model of the previous section is essentially static. In addition, its simplicity hides the starkness of the main result that the market equilibrium may be radically different from the optimum even if the external effect is small. To illustrate the point that different patterns of planting can have strongly differing implications for external effects, this section provides some illustrative calculations of the impact of the introduction of transgenic crops in a highly stylised agricultural district, composed of equal-sized fields occupying a square territory of width and length n. There are therefore n 2 fields, each of which can be planted with either a transgenic or non-transgenic variety. For any given total number of fields given over to the transgenic variety, I consider three patterns of planting. In the first case, 'externality minimizing', the allocation of the transgenic variety to fields is done so as to minimize the number of adjacent non-transgenically planted fields. In the second case, 'externality maximizing' the number of adjacent fields of non-transgenic crops is maximized. In the third case, 'random' the fields given over to the transgenic crop are chosen at random, with each field having an equal probability of being chosen. The second variant of the modelmaximizing the externality -may be seen as highly artificial, but it provides a useful benchmark. The first variant is the pattern which would be chosen by a social planner -it is optimal, given the number of fields dedicated to the transgenic crop. The third variety can be seen as the outcome when each farmer acts independently.
True patterns of planting will typically fall somewhere between the first and third variants. The planting of varieties is often geographically concentrated because of underlying correlations of soil types and local weather conditions between farms. In addition, informal and formal information transmission mechanisms between farmers, plus variations in the dominant local supplier of farming inputs, and in the sites of food processors, all lead to clusters in patterns of planting. Against this, risk management practices by farmers and individual preferences tend to lower local concentration. As a result the random model may be a useful first approximation to actual patterns of land use.
I proceed as follows. For n=20 I calculate the pattern of GM planting which minimizes and maximizes the externality effect, assuming that the external effect is confined to the adjacent fields. Thus for 1 transgenically-planted field in the centre of the square, another eight fields are affected. In fact for n=20, with only 49 fields planted transgenically all other fields can be adjacent to a transgenically-planted field. For the random planting, I
draw sequences of 50 random numbers from the set {1,…,400}. Each number then represents a field given over to the transgenic crops. The number of adjacent fields affected is then calculated. Figure 1 shows some illustrative patterns of the spatial externality (for n=9 rather than the value of n used in the actual simulations). In the figure, black-shaded squares represent fields planted with transgenic crops. The diagonally-shaded squares then represent the fields in the shadow of the transgenically-planted fields.
[ Figure 1 about here]
As an alternative method, some approximate theoretical calculations can be used to predict the effect of random planting. Suppose that (t-1) randomly selected fields have been denoted transgenic and that as a result, a proportion π of the total area is affected by the transgenically-planted fields (π includes those fields actually planted with the transgenic varieties plus their shadow). Then the probability that the next randomly selected field (the t th )
lies in the shadow is approximately π and the probability it lies outside of the shadow is approximately (1-π). If it does lie in the shadow then no new fields are added to the shadow.
On the other hand if the t th field lies outside of the shadow, then for n=20, the expected number of fields in the shadow plus the field itself is 8.41. 6 It follows that an approximate differential equation governing π is, 6 Note that this number allows for the fact that transgenic fields near the corners or one edge of the territory have a smaller shadow than fields away from the edges. Formally in a nxn area, there are (n-1)x(n-1) fields with a shadow of 9. The remaining (2n-1) fields that line the perimeter each have a shadow of 3. Thus the expected shadow of a randomly selected field is 9-6(2n-1)/n 
Of course this formula is approximate. In practice the t th field may not lie in the shadow of an existing transgenic field, but it may lie adjacent to the shadow in which case the number of new fields added to the shadow will be smaller than that predicted by the theory.
Additionally, the formula becomes nonsensical for large values of t, because with t=400 all fields must be transgenically planted. However, for low levels of GM planting it works well, as figure 2 illustrates. There, in addition to curves depicting the consequences of the externality maximizing and minimizing patterns of planting, figure 2 plots two curves, one of which is the mean from the randomly generated sets of transgenically-planted fields ('mean') and one of which is equation (9) ('theory'). In fact this equation explains over 99% of the variation in the data generated by the random numbers method.
[ Figure 2 about here]
The results in figure 2 suggest that if transgenic crops occupy only 10% of the area, then over 60% of the total area could be denied to non-transgenic crops though the spatial externality is only one field in extent. 7 Although the details should perhaps not be taken too 7 Further simulations were carried out with larger potential shadows and larger values of n.
Typically, with a shadow extending to two field widths, less than 10% of the area was available to non-GM crops when only 10% of the area was randomly planted with transgenic varieties. With three field widths only a fraction of the territory remained outside of the shadow.
seriously, figure 2 does illustrate some important principles. First, the area potentially affected in two dimensions is proportional to the square of the area planted and is therefore not linear. Second, most crucially for policy purposes, the different patterns of planting can have widely differing patterns of impact. The area unavailable for non-GM varieties with random planting is up to 3.7 times the area unavailable under the externality minimizing solution.
Some work on the dynamics of planting was also carried out. I use a baseline model in which the GM crops have a cost advantage of 10%, three percent of the population are indifferent between GM and non-GM (θ=0), 65% would refuse to take the GM at any positive price (θ=a), and the remainder have values of θ uniformly distributed on (0,a). This particular configuration of parameters yields an initial market share of 5% for the GM variety in the first period. About one third of all the land area is then unavailable for the non-GM crop.
Consequently, in the next period the profitability of the GM crop falls to zero. Assume that the fields newly planted with the GM variety in the second period are adjacent to those used for the GM crops in the first period. An equilibrium is reached in which approximately 6% of the land is used for GM, 61% is used for the non-GM crop and a further 33% in the shadow of the GM crop remains uncultivated. Changes to the parameters around the initial values (e.g. In discussing the robustness of the proposition we have already seen the possibilities of Coasean bargaining and also the limitations. In this section, I consider other possible interventions in the market equilibrium, designed to maximize the total surplus which in turn implies efficiency in consumption and efficiency in production. The latter means minimizing the total costs of producing aggregate consumption levels (q * n,q * g). Given a GM-affected area of δ, this implies total costs = cn(q * n+ δ)+cg(q * g-δ). So minimizing production costs given the aggregate consumption level also means minimizing δ and thus it follows that production efficiency is also externality minimizing. The main conclusion from this section is that achieving consumption efficiency is relatively straightforward, but that production efficiency is more problematic.
To create consumption efficiency there has to be some incentive for farmers to sow the non-GM crop when they lie in the shadow of GM crops. In this way the crops can co-exist in a market equilibrium. For a non-GM farmer, the effect of being in a region affected by GM crops is to lower the price received per unit from pn to pg. Hence one Pigouvian instrument is 8 The results on the rapid spread of the GM contaminated land deviate somewhat from Belcher et al, 2005. The big differences are that I incorporate consumer demand (that slows the spread) and allow the possibility of unused land. These two elements help promote coexistence.
be added to the shadow, in which case δ would rise. Meanwhile the total quantity of each type of crop reaching consumers would be unchanged, so consumer prices would be unchanged.
This would lower the profitability of GM relative to non-GM grown in the shadow, encouraging more farms to switch from GM to non-GM.
In the second case, suppose the unit of land lies outside the shadow of other GM farms, so that its produce can be sold as non-GM. Since this yields greater profits than GM at the market equilibrium, then the alternative market equilibria are not stable in the face of perturbations of this kind. Finally, the conversion could release some other plot of land from the shadow, but be in the shadow itself. The net effect would be that the quantity of non-GM crop reaching consumers would rise. As a result, GM crops would become relatively more profitable compared to non-GM crops grown in the shadow encouraging the unit of land to be converted back to GM. Thus unlike the first two cases, in the face of this kind of perturbation the equilibrium is stable.
It is also true that the market equilibrium where s=Δp[δ/δ*(qn,qg)] and δ=δ*(qn,qg) is also not stable in the face of some perturbations: if a unit of land used for growing GM crops is switched to non-GM at the social optimum then δ rises, raising an incentive for other GM farms to switch varieties.
Summing up, market-based instruments are relatively easy to implement if the goal is purely one of consumption efficiency, but the equilibria may be non-unique and not stable. As a result, assuring production efficiency is problematic. So, finally, let us briefly investigate policies which mix market-based incentives with planting regulations.
Obviously one way to achieve optimality is to specify the land which is to be devoted to each crop. This encounters the familiar Hayekian issue that that planner must know consumer preferences if the optimal allocation of land is to be made, but typically preferences -25-are not known with this precision. A relatively straightforward way to overcome the problem is to mix a unit subsidy with a licensing scheme for crops. Any grower may apply for a license to grow GM crops. Such a license will only be approved however, when the resulting pattern of land use is externality-minimizing. If the subsidy for non-GM crops is set at Δp then demand for the license will be up to the point at which Δp=cn-cg. In this way both consumption and production efficiency may be achievable.
Discussion.
This paper has examined the problem of spatial contamination by transgenic crops. Its essential lesson is that efficiency is unlikely to obtain without regulation and that in some circumstances co-existence between GM and non-GM varieties may be unsustainable in an unregulated market. As a result policy interventions were considered. The necessity of these policy instruments obviously rests on the assumption of an external effect flowing from the introduction of transgenic crops, but it also rests on the uninterrupted spread of the externality.
To the extent that natural physical barriers, intervening crops, cities, etc. separate groups of farms growing the same crop into isolated islands of production, it is possible that a rough approximation to optimality can be achieved without extensive regulation. However, note that as long as there is no cost to the GM-planting farmer from introducing a transgenic crop into a previously GM-free geographical area, then equilibrium between GM and non-GM cultivars is inherently unstable.
The feasibility of the instruments depends in part on the size of the barrier which must be maintained in order to avoid cross-contamination between transgenic and non-transgenic cultivars. Although physical barriers such as hedges and woodland can reduce the flow of dispersing pollen, the conclusion of the Treu and Emberlin survey was that such features -26-diluted rather than contained the flow. Meanwhile safe distances are potentially large, to go by the UK Soil Association's decision to define a circle of radius 6 miles (9.6 km) from a planted crop to the nearest field of its transgenic relative, within which it would reserve the right to label a crop 'non-organic'. For non-organic, non-transgenic crops, the requirements will ultimately be determined by consumer preferences and may not be so large. National regulators (see Table 1 ) have set much smaller distances, but even they are of the order of a field-width, which as we have seen above can imply large areas affected by GM crops.
A final important issue which is not captured in the model is the important issue of irreversibility. For transgenic oilseed rape, Norris et al, 1999, found viable seed in the soil persisted for up to 3 years after the initial planting of the crop. In its list of qualifying regulations for organic crops, the UK's Soil Association will not accept crops grown on land where transgenic crops have been grown within the last five years. Irreversibility does not alter the equilibrium analysis presented in section 2. However it affects the feasibility of certain paths to equilibrium. In particular, it may be problematic to approach the social optimum from a situation where the GM crop is grown beyond its optimal extent or where its planting has been poorly co-ordinated. 1. 'Possible' means that the market equilibrium is a possible outcome given the conditions under which Case i, i=1,…,4 pertains without further restrictions on the parameters.
2. qg** = demand for GM crop when pn=a and pg= cg. That is the maximum demand for the GM crop possibly compatible with a market equilibrium.
3. If θ L ≤a-cg is satisfied then production of the GM crop is profitable in the absence of the non-GM product.
-32- Note: Shaded area = non-GM crop sold as non-GM. Diagonally shaded = non-GM crop sold as GM. Unshaded area = GM crop.
